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COMMENTS
TOWARD AN END TO CONSUMER FRUSTRATION-
MAKING THE SONG-BEVERLY CONSUMER
WARRANTY ACT WORK
INTRODUCTION
[T]here is a fair chance that his newly delivered color TV,
or stereo equipment, or dishwasher, or car won't work. It
probably won't explode or cut him, or electrocute him-
nothing that dramatic. It will just have something wrong
with it. The consumer may then discover that getting the
difficulty taken care of is a time consuming and maddening
experience. He may, in short, discover that frustration-
not satisfaction-is his lot.'
These words, written by a law professor in 1969, aptly de-
scribed the predicament in which the average consumer was ac-
customed to finding himself after purchasing one of the countless
products on the American consumer market. Professor Mueller's
article is but one of several articles and comments published
in recent years which have deplored the consumer's sorry lot with
respect to product warranties and have advocated legislation
geared to enhance consumer rights and remedies in a market
flooded with substandard products.' As has 'been correctly pointed
out, the average consumer has few remedies available to him
when he finds that he has purchased a defective product, and
none of these is satisfactory.8 Even more distressing perhaps
1. Mueller, Contracts of Frustration, 78 YALE L.J. 576 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Mueller].
2. See, e.g., Eovaldi & Gestrin, Justice for Consumers: The Mechanics of
Redress, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 281 (1971); Furness, Time is Now, 4 Trial 17
(Aug./Sept. 1968); Jones & Boyer, Improving the Quality of Justice in the
Marketplace: The Need for Better Consumer Remedies, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
357 (1971-72); Kessler, Protection of the Consumer Under Modern Sales Law,
74 YALE L.J. 262 (1964); Schrag, On Her Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting
the Consumer in New York City, 80 YALE L.J. 1529 (1971); Whitford, Law and
the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the Automobile Warranty, Wisc. L.
REV. 1006 (1968); Comment, Consumer Protection and Warranties of Quality:
A Proposal for a Statutory Warranty in Sales to Consumers, 34 ALBANY L. REV.
339 (1970); Comment, Law and the Ghetto Consumer, 14 CATH. LAw. 214
(1968); Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective
Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395 (1966); Comment, Restricting
Disclaimer of the Warranty of Merchantability in Consumer Sales: Proposed
Alternatives to the UCC, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 895 (1971).
3. Mueller, supra note 1, at 576-77.
575
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than the product itself is that the "law" - which to the consumer
means expensive lawyers, indecipherable statutes, and endless
waiting for a satisfactory result-"is of almost no use whatever." 4
Since the appearance of Professor Mueller's article, Califor-
nia has enacted a major piece of legislation aimed at eliminat-
ing precisely the sort of frustration he described. This is the
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, which took effect -in 197 1.r
The Act was designed to complement the California Commercial
Code6 and provide remedies to buyers of consumer goods7 in ad-
dition to those already provided by the Commercial Code and in
the case law.
The Background of the Act
Even before the California Commercial Code became law, it
was recognized that its provisions respecting sales warranties
would not be a panacea for the ills of warranty law.' Even as
comprehensively revised by the Commercial Code, sales law is
not designed to encourage small, one-time claims nor offer pro-
tection for the contract expectations of the non-merchant buyer.'
Instead, "[t]he law of sales was developed to meet the needs of
those with a substantial economic stake in the effective operation
of agreement as a commercial tool."'" Because the consumer is
4. Id. at 577.
5. The Act (CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1790-1795.5 (West 1973)) was introduced
by Senate Bill 272, which became Cal. Stats. (1970), ch. 1333, § 1, at 2478 and
took effect Mar. 1, 1971. The amendments were introduced by Senate Bill 742,
which became Cal. Stats. (1971), ch. 1523, § 3, at 3002. These took effect on
Jan. 1, 1972. The Act was further amended in 1974, to extend the scope of
section 1795.5 of the Civil Code to include used goods "regardless of when such
goods may have been manufactured." Cal. Stats. (1974), ch. 169, § -, at -.
6. The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) was adopted in California in
1963, and took effect in 1965, as the California Commercial Code. CAL. COMM.
CODE § 1101 et seq. (West 1964) (Cal. Stats. (1963), ch. 819). Not all of
the U.C.C. provisions were adopted. Notably absent from the California version
is section 2-302 of the U.C.C. dealing with unconscionable contract clauses.
For an interesting article urging the adoption in California of a proposed
statute on unconscionability see Hurd & Bush, Unconscionability: A Matter of
Conscience for California Consumers, 25 HAST. L.J. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Hurd & Bush].
7. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1791(a) (West 1973) defines "consumer goods" as
any new mobilehome, motor vehicle, machine, appliance, like product,
or part thereof that is used or bought for use primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes. "Consumer goods" also means any new
good or product, except for soft goods and consumables, the retail sale
of which is accompanied by an express warranty to the retail buyer
thereof and such product is used or bought for use primarily for'per-
sonal, family, or household purposes.
8. Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California
Law of Sales Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 281, 282 (1961) [hereinafter cited
as Ezer].
9. Mueller, supra note 1, at 590.
10. Id.
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usually provided by the retailer or manufacturer with a printed-
form contract, the terms of which he did not bargain for but to
which he is required to "adhere"," the words "bargain" and
"agreement" have no real application to consumer sales.' 2
Amidst an era of "consumer revolution" lawmakers saw a
need to place the consumer in !a more favorable legal position
with respect to the superior bargaining power of manufacturers
and sellers of consumer goods. It was recognized that the
consumer must be put on an equal footing with the manufac-
turer and retailer. This means that at the very least he should
have the opportunity to know the exact terms of his purchase
and, more importantly, exactly what can be done if the product
turns out to be faulty. In order to afford the consumer this op-
portunity, the legislation called for would need to clarify his
rights under manufacturers' and sellers' warranties, which too
often are merely sales gimmicks'" and instruments of unfair
dealing.' 4 The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act evolved in
response to the call for an end to consumer frustration with prod-
ucts that do not work and warranties that promise much but de-
liver little.
Has the frustration ended? This comment examines the pro-
visions of the Song-Beverly Act respecting the rights and remedies
of the consumer who has purchased a defective product. In
analyzing these provisions particular attention is focused on their
practical applicability and on the problems the consumer faces in
calling them to his assistance. Beginning with a discussion of
the operative coverage of the Act and proceeding to an analysis
of those provisions which most clearly attempt to change the law
of consumer warranties in California, the question of whether the
consumer is really better off now than he was prior to the enact-
ment of the Song-Beverly Act will be examined. Although some
suggestions are made for improving the Act, it is the principal
11. For a discussion of adhesion contracts see generally Kessler, Contracts
of Adhesion--Some Thoughts about Feedom of Contract, 43 COLuM. L. REV.
629 (1943); Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 HARv. L.
REv. 198 (1919); Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv. L. REV. 529 (1971).
12. Mueller, supra note 1, at 590.
13. See San Jose Post-Record, Oct. 29, 1969, at 1, col. 4. This article covers
an anticipated hearing in Los Angeles before the California Senate Business and
Professions Committee and reflects the testimony which Senator Alfred Song, co-
author of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, expected to receive.
14. The use of warranties as instruments of unfair dealing was a primary
target of those who advocated a change in the law respecting consumer warran-
ties. See Statement of the Association of California Consumers Before the Sen-
ate Committee on Business and Professions at Hearings on Warranty Protection
at Los Angeles on 11/3/69, Prepared by Richard A. Elbrecht, at I [hereinafter
cited as Statement].
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concern of this comment to demonstrate how the Act can be an
effective tool for consumers in its present form.
THE OPERATIVE COVERAGE OF THE SONG-BEVERLY ACT
The Song-Beverly Act was never intended to replace the
California Commercial Code as the general law of warranties.' "
Rather the provisions of the Act are cumulative and not restrictive
of any remedy otherwise available to the consumer.'"
The Act renders special assistance to consumers in three
ways.' 7 First, it offers meaningful protection to the consumer
who purchases a product which is accompanied by a written
promise to repair, replace, or service that product, should it prove
defective. Second, it provides assurance that goods sold by
sample will conform to the sample. Third, it provides rigid
standards for disclaiming the implied warranties of merchant-
ability and fitness for purpose. This insures that the buyer wil not
be victimized by surprise disclaimers, particularly when he has
purchased a complicated machine or appliance which he would
normally expect to be fully warranted by the seller.' 8
There are some noteworthy limitations on the scope of the
Song-Beverly Act. First, its present version'0 applies only to con-
sumer goods sold on or after January 1, 1972, and manufactured
on or after March 1, 1971.20 Second, it applies only to goods
sold "at retail" and "in this state."'" Third, the Act distinguishes
between new and used goods.22 Only one section of the Act
15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1790.3 (West 1973) reads:
The provisions of this chapter shall not affect the rights and obligations
of parties determined by reference to the Commercial Code except that,
where the provisions of the Commercial Code conflict with rights guar-
anteed to buyers of consumer goods under the provisions of this chap-
ter, the provisions of this chapter shall prevail.
16. Id. § 1790.4.
17. Warranties-U.C.C. and the Song-Beverly Act, Program Material, Cali-
fornia Consumer Law Conference 172, 173 (California Continuing Education of
the Bar, June, 1973) [hereinafter cited as California Consumer Law Conference].
18. As indicated, the California Code of Civil Procedure section 1791(a), in
defining "consumer goods," distinguishes between goods falling into a certain
classification (mobilehomes, motor vehicles, machines, appliances or like prod-
ucts) and goods which do not fit into this classification but are nonetheless ac-
companied by an express warranty. For the text of § 1791(a) see note 7 supra.
The legislature evidently felt that goods of the first sort are deserving of the
Act's protection even when they are not expressly warranted against defects.
Compare this definition of "consumer goods" with the broad definition of
"goods" in section 2105(1) of the California Commercial Code.
19. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1790-1795.5 (West 1973). For its legislative history
see note 5 supra.
20. Cal. Stats. (1971), ch. 1523, § 18, at 3008.
21. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1792, 1792.1, 1792.2, 1793.2(a), 1793.3, 1795.5
(West 1973).
22. The Act's definition of consumer goods includes only new mobilehomes,
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deals specifically with the sale of used goods. Under this sec-
tion the applicability to used goods of any of the Act's Provi-
sions respecting new goods is predicated upon the existence of an
express warranty, made by a distributor or retailer, which accom-
panies the sale of such used goods.1
3
Although these limitations may prove somewhat deflating to
those seeking a complete cure for the warranty abuses inherent in
the typical consumer transaction, there is still much within
the Act from which consumers may derive considerable assist-
ance. Where the Commercial Code is deficient in providing con-
sumers with substantial rights, the Song-Beverly Act is designed
to fill the gap or prevail where its provisions conflict with those of
the Commercial Code. 24  The Act also provides for treble dam-
ages in the case of a willful violation by the manufacturer or
seller.25  The buyer may also recover reasonable attorney fees.26
Except under express provisions, the Act declares void a waiver of
any of the rights guaranteed under it.2 7  The feature which most
clearly distinguishes the Song-Beverly Act from other consumer-
oriented legislation, however, is the special attention it devotes to
motor vehicles, machines, appliances and the like or any new good or product
(bought for personal, family, or household use) which is accompanied by an ex-
press warranty. Id. § 179 1(a).
23. Id. § 1795.5. If there is an express warranty on used goods, the war-
.rantor has the same duties as those imposed on the manufacturer of new goods
who gives an express warranty. Among other things this means that implied
warranties are preserved and may not be limited, modified, or disclaimed.
Prior to a 1974 amendment (Cal. Stats. (1974), ch. 169, § -, at -) it
was not clear whether used goods, like new goods, would have to be manufac-
tured after March 1, 1971, in order to be covered under the Act. See Cal. Stats.
(1971), ch. 1523, § 18, at 3008. The amended portion of section 1795.5 of the
Civil Code reads:
The obligation of the distributor or retail seller who makes express war-
ranties with respect to used goods that are sold in this state shall extend
to the sale of all such used goods, regardless of when such goods may
have been manufactured.
The amendment eliminates a potential source of uncertainty in the Act. Logi-
cally, it would seem that when used goods are concerned the important date
would be the date of sale and not manufacture. This follows from the fact that
the Act is of assistance to purchasers of used goods only when they have been
expressly warranted by the seller. Since the manufacturer is not responsible for
the goods once they have been resold (except for the case of personal injury),
the date of manufacture should not be important. See Substantive Law Memo
on Warranties and Remedies under U.C.C. and California Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act, September 18, 1973, at 30, Prepared for California Consumer Law
Conference by Richard A. Elbrecht [hereinafter cited as Substantive Law Memo].
24. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1790.3 (West 1973).
25. Id. § 1794(a). See also CAL. CIv. CODE H8 1791.1(d), 1794.2 (West
1973).
26. Id. § 1794(b).
27. Id. § 1790.1. This section provides:
Any waiver by the buyer of consumer goods of the provisions of this
chapter, except as expressly provided in this chapter, shall be deemed
contrary to public policy and shall be unenforceable and void.
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the various theories of warranty law and the attempt it makes to
mold these theories to consumer needs.
THE ExPREss WARRANTY
Definition
Aware of the increasing exploitation of express warranties
in product advertising, the legislature made the Song-Beverly Act
particularly applicable to the manufacturer or seller who chooses
to give such a warranty. 28
Generally speaking, a warranty is said to be express when it is
founded upon the seller's particular conduct or actual representa-
tions as to the nature or quality of a product.29 It is important,
however, to distinguish the specific definition of express warranty
in the Commercial Code from that in the Song-Beverly Act.80 The
Commercial Code specifies three methods by which the express
warranty may be created: (1) by an affirmation of fact or prom-
ise relating to the goods; (2) by a description of the goods; (3)
by a sample or model."' In each case the facts which give rise
to the warranty must be a part of the "basis of the bargain" before
there is an express warranty. 2
In the Song-Beverly Act there is no requirement that the war-
ranty form a basis of the bargain,38 a term which the authors of
the Commercial Code have chosen not to define.3 4 Instead, the
Act designates two methods by which an express warranty may
arise. 5 The first of these is a statement in writing by which
28. See Explanation of SB 272, August 12, 1970, at 1 (available from Sena-
tor Alfred H. Song's office) [hereinafter cited as Explanation].
29. Comment, The Contractual Aspect of Consumer Protection: Recent
Developments in the Law of Sale Warranties, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1430, 1431-32
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Recent Developments].
30. The Song-Beverly Act "defines" the express warranty. CAL. Civ. CoDn
§ 1791.2 (West 1973). The Commercial Code refers only to the method of cre-
ating an express warranty. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2313 (West 1964).
31. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2313(1) (West 1964).
32. Id.
33. Compare CAL. COMM. CODE § 2313(1) (West 1964), with CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1791.2(a) (West 1973). Regardless of whether the warranty arises by
writing or sample, the Act makes no mention of "basis of the bargain."
34. Comment, Consumer Protection: The Effect of the Song-Beverly Con-
sumer Warranty Act, 4 PAC. L.J. 183, 186 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Com-
ment, Song-Beverly]. The author of this comment refers to Comments 3 and
8 to section 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which suggest that state-
ments or affirmations of fact made by the seller become part of the bargain un-
less "clear affirmative proof" (Comment 3) or "good reason" (Comment 8) is
shown to the contrary.
35. California Consumer Law Conference, supra note 17, at 175. The author
of this section of the Conference Program Material asserts that for this reason
the Song-Beverly Act's definition of "express warranty" is much narrower than
the Commercial Code's. He emphasizes that statements such as "this shirt is
[Vol. 14
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the manufacturer, distributor, or retailer "undertakes to preserve or
maintain the utility or performance of the consumer good or
provide compensation if there is a failure in utility or perform-
ance. .. ."6 The second method by which an express warranty
is created is by sample or model.87  This is similar to one of the
methods permitted by the Commercial Code, s8 except that the
Act does not require that the warranty be shown to be part of
the basis of the bargain. Only rarely would a consumer fare better
by applying one of these provisions instead of the other; practi-
cally speaking, there is no difference between them.8 9
Creating the Express Written Warranty
To create an express written warranty the warrantor must
have made a written promise to repair or replace defective goods
or to refund the money paid for these goods, or, in the alterna-
tive, to service the goods to insure their continued utility.40
The requirement of a writing is, of course, a major differ-
ence between this definition of the express warranty and that set
forth in the Commercial Code. The Act says that pursuant to
the written statement the warrantor must undertake to preserve
or maintain the utility of the good or compensate the buyer for a
failure in utility or performance. 41  Strictly construed this section
could render meaningless a written warranty of the following
genre:
The manufacturer hereby warrants that this gadget will oper-
ate properly in normal usage for a period of one year from
the date of sale.
The reason for nullifying such a warranty is that there is nothing in
this writing by which the manufacturer has expressly promised to
maintain the utility of the good or compensate the buyer in the
event the good fails to perform! Of course, such a promise may
seem implicit to the buyer, but does the Act's requirement of a
written statement permit anything which is not in the written
statement to be included as part of the express warranty? The
Sanforized," "this pen will write through butter," "this wood is mahogany," or
"this unit can cool 2800 cu. ft." would not be express warranties under the Act
(presumably because none of these assertions conveys a promise to maintain fu-
ture utility of the goods in question). Under the California Commercial Code
§ 2313, however, statements like these would be express warranties since any af-
firmation of fact forming the basis of the bargain is an express warranty. Id.
at 176.
36. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1791.2(a)(1) (West 1973).
37. Id. § 1791.2(a)(2).
38. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2313(c) (West 1964).
39. Comment, Song-Beverly, supra note 34, at 187 & n.45.
40. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1791.2(a)(1) (West 1973).
41. Id.
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Act provides no clear answer to this question, but neither does it
foreclose turning to other doctrines of law which may suggest an
answer.
For example, we know that the provision in the Commercial
Code concerning the use of parol evidence to prove the exist-
ence of terms not found in a written contract permits the inclu-
sion of those terms if they are consistent with the written
terms and there is no finding that the writing was intended as a
final and exclusive statement of all terms.4 2 The California Su-
preme Court has taken an even more liberal approach to the pa-
rol evidence rule by allowing evidence of a prior oral agreement
to modify terms reduced to writing whenever it can be shown
that the collateral agreement might naturally be excluded from
the written contract.48
The California treatment of the parol evidence rule suggests
that it is doubtful the legislature intended that the writing required
to create an express warranty under the Song-Beverly Act would
have to contain each and every term to be enforceable. Such a
requirement would discourage manufacturers genuinely inter-
ested in warranting their products from using succinct and eas-
ily understandable language in the warranty. Worse yet, a require-
ment that everything must be in writing to be enforceable as
part of the warranty would create a gaping loophole, through
which the unscrupulous warrantor could escape his obligations on
what would appear to the unwary buyer to be a genuine promise
to repair or compensate for a defective product.
It is manifestly unfair and contrary to the spirit of the Act
to permit a manufacturer to reap the advertising benefits of an
express written warranty and then escape Is obligations under
the Act44 on the specious ground that the manufacturer's own
writing did not conform with the apparent requirements of the
Act's definition of the express written warranty. That the Act,
unlike the Commercial Code, requires a writing for an effectual
express warranty (except where the warranty is by sample or
model) is perhaps due to the legislature's desire to protect both
manufacturer and consumer from -the vagaries of the parol evi-
dence rule. To interpret this requirement to preclude liability un-
der the Act for a written warranty, such as the one just discussed,
would do violence to the legislative intent to give maximum pro-
tection to the buyer under an express warranty. 48
42. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2202 (West 1964).
43. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,
Inc., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 442 P.2d 641, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1968); Masterson v. Sine.
68 Cal. 2d 222, 436 P.2d 561, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968).
44. See text accompanying notes 130-184 infra.
45. See generally Explanation, supra note 28.
[Vol. 14
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Prospective Character of the Express Written Warranty
The fact that, in order to satisfy the Act's defnition of the
express written warranty, the warrantor must have undertaken
to preserve or maintain the future utility of the warranted prod-
uct is another departure from the express warranty defined in the
Commercial Code. It is true that the Commercial Code makes
no mention of the need on the part of the warrantor to promise
specific, prospective action should the goods sold prove defec-
tive.46 In actual practice, however, the notion that an express
warranty may be impliedly prospective-that is, violable by the
failure to take specific remedial action after the date of sale-is
not new to California. In the case of Mack v. Hugh M. Corn-
stock Associates4 7 an appellate court held that when a product is
expressly or impliedly warranted against defects of workmanship
of materials for a specific period of time and it proves defective,
the warranty is prospective and the statute of limitations for re-
covery is tolled "during the time the seller honestly endeavors to
make repairs .. . or at least until . . . it becomes reasonably
apparent to the owner that the warranty cannot be met."
48
The Mack rule was extended one step further in the recent
case of Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp. v. Allis-Chalmers Manu-
facturing Co.49 In that case Kaiser purchased a motor from Allis-
Chalmers to drive its cement mills. The motor came with an
express warranty under which Allis-Chalmers promised to repair
any defects and maintain the motor in proper working condition
for a period of one year. During the period of the warranty the
defendant was repeatedly called in to repair an apparent defect
in the machine which caused it to overheat. The defendant
concluded that the overheating resulted from Kaiser's inadequate
ventilation system. On these assurances Kaiser installed a new
ventilation system, only to discover three and one-half years later
that poor ventilation had not been the cause of the excessive heat,
and that in the meantime the motor's electrical winding had been
damaged by deterioration of the wiring insulation resulting from
overheating. The court, applying the prospective warranty doc-
trine espoused in Mack and the earlier case of Aced v. Hobbs-
Sesack Plumbing Co., ° held that Allis-Chalmers had incurred
legal responsibility for a breach of warranty to repair, which in-
46. See CAL. COMM. CODE § 2313 (West 1964). Neither the California
Code Comment nor the Uniform Commercial Code Comment makes specific ref-
erence to the notion that express warranties may be prospective in nature.
47. 225 Cal. App. 2d 583, 37 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1964).
48. Id. at 589, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
49. 35 Cal. App. 3d 948, 111 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1973).
50. 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1%1).
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cluded the obligation flowing from nonperformance of the stated
agreement to replace or properly adjust.5
The Kaiser case thus stands for the proposition that a war-
ranty to repair, replace, or refund the purchase price is prospec-
tive in character and that responsibility under it does not neces-
sarily end at the expiration of the stated warranty period. Where
the defect is not reasonably discoverable by the buyer, and where
the warrantor has the opportunity to discover it but fails to, the
obligation under the warranty will survive the warranty period,
at least for a reasonable time.
Of course, the Kaiser case does not concern a sale of con-
sumer goods, but the principle it espouses should be applicable
to the sale of any goods under an express warranty to repair or re-
place. Cases like Kaiser and Mack give viability to the concept of
a prospective warranty, perhaps to a greater extent than was in-
tended by the draftsmen of the Commercial Code. 52 In interpret-
ing the Song-Beverly Act courts should not be afraid to integrate
principles such as those -formulated in Kaiser and Mack into the
structure of the Act. To give full effect to its provisions the
Act should be read as an attempt to synthesize, restate, and clar-
ify existing principles of law. So construed, it can be an effec-
tive tool not only for assisting consumers in protecting their rights
under product warranties, but also for re-emphasizing to mer-
chants, manufacturers, and consumers the fundamental nature of
these rights. By defining the express written warranty as a prom-
ise to preserve or maintain the utility of a consumer good or pro-
vide compensation for a failure in performance, the Act has fo-
cused on the fundamental principle that a warranty is of little
value unless the warrantor is prepared to back it up with specific
action.
The Express Warranty Distinguished from Affirmations of Value
Like the Commercial Code, the Act does not mandate the
51. 35 Cal. App. 3d at 959-60, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 217-18.
52. The Commercial Code does not specifically provide for prospective war-
ranties (see note 46 supra), but there is evidence that to interpret an express
warranty as a guarantee against defects occurring subsequent to the time .of pur-
chase would be acceptable under the Code. See CAL. COMM. CODE § 2313, Uni-
form Commercial Code Comment 2 (West 1964), wherein the draftsmen admit
that the scope of this section defining the express warranty is limited and in-
tended only as a "useful guidance" in deciding warranty cases. It was not in-
tended to disturb, for example, "those lines of case law growth which have recog-
nized that warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the di-
rect parties to such a contract." Id.
Both Mack and Kaiser appear to be logical extensions of the proposition
that an express warranty carries with it an implied promise to cure defects which
did not exist at the time of sale.
[Vol. 14
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use of the particular words "warrant" or "guarantee"-of talis-
manic importance to some judges 5 8 to create an express war-
ranty. Nevertheless, mere affirmations of the value of the goods or
a dealer's commendation, which is nothing more than his own
high opinion of what he sells, are not sufficient to create an ex-
press warranty. 5
4
The Act avoids the problem of distinguishing affirma-
tion of fact from mere opinion, or "puffing" as it is generally
called, 5 by requiring a writing and by narrowly defining the ex-
press warranty as a promise to maintain continued utility of the
goods. Under the Commercial Code, questions of affirmation of
value or seller's opinion must be resolved by determining whether
the statements made by the seller became, under the circumstan-
ces and based upon objective judgment, part of the basis of the
bargain.5 6 Written primarily with merchants and parties of rel-
atively equal bargaining power in mind, the Commercial Code as-
sumes a degree of commercial sophistication in the contracting
parties. The experienced merchant or businessman may reason-
ably be expected to distinguish between affirmations of fact and
"puffing," 57 but the same cannot be said for the less sophisti-
cated consumer. Part of the consumer's frustration is his in-
ability to ascertain when the seller is asserting that he stands be-
hind the product and when he is adroitly engaged in a sales pitch.
Although "puffing" is not a problem under the Act, it re-
mains a problem for the consumer. If he has been led by a mer-
chant to believe that a product is warranted when in fact the
53. See W. HAwKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE U.C.C., vol. I,
at 57 (1964). California has done away with the requirement of special words
such as "warrant" or "guarantee" to create an express warranty, substituting only
the requirement that the buyer rely on the affirmation inr good faith. Steiner
v. Jarrett, 130 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 869, 280 P.2d 235 (1954); Cole v. Weber,
69 Cal. App. 394, 231 P. 353 (1924).
54. Compare CAL. COMM. CODE § 2313(2) (West 1964) with CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1791.2(b) (West 1973). Under the Act statements of general policy
concerning customer satisfaction, not subject to any limitations, do not create an
express warranty. Under the Commercial Code, however, the affirmation that
the seller will "stand behind the goods" is probably an express warranty. See Cal-
ifornia Consumer Law Conference, supra note 17, at 176. See also Stott v.
Johnson, 36 Cal. 2d 864, 229 P.2d 348 (1951), where it was held that the de-
fendant-paint retailer's assurance that the company would reimburse the buyer for
labor and materials if the paint "goes bad" constituted an express warranty.
55. For a discussion of the nature of "puffing" and its relation to warranty
law, see 1 WILLISTON ON SALES § 202 (rev. ed. 1948). See also Comment, Ex-
press Warranties and Greater Consumer Protection from Sales Talk, 50 MARQ.
L. REv. 88 (1966).
56. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2313, Uniform Commercial Code Comment 8
(West 1964).
57. The cases have so held. See, e.g., Perry v. Magee, 116 Cal. App. 2d
155, 253 P.2d 488 (1953); Alexander v. Stone, 29 Cal. App. 488, 156 P. 998
(1916).
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
Act's requirements to create an express warranty have not been
met, the consumer will be relegated to seeking redress under
either the Commercial Code or a common law theory of fraud or
misrepresentation. As to a breach of an oral warranty or abuses
arising out of a dealer's "puffing," the Song-Beverly Act offers
no protection.
Misleading Advertising and the Express Warranty
At the core of the consumer's frustration is the failure of
both products and their manufacturers to live up to the reason-
able expectations of the buyer. Often these expectations have
been engendered by techniques of modem advertising." Fre-
quently the buyer is disappointed to discover that the warranty
that was advertised is not in the fine print "agreement" he has
signed. The consumer seldom reads the contract form until
after he signs it and has become bound by its terms."9 Then it
is usually too late for him to complain that the advertisement he
saw or read promised something more than what he bought. He
will have difficulty in asserting the existence of an express war-
ranty under the Song-Beverly Act, for he must show that the form
contract he signed somehow incorporated by reference 'the terms
of the advertisement and thereby satisfied the requirement of a
writing.60  In the usual case this is a difficult chore, for the
form contract will undoubtedly contain a clause by which the
buyer purports to agree that the form before him is an exclusive
and exhaustive statement of the terms of the contract.6 ' Neverthe-
less, considering the significant role advertising plays in commer-
cial transactions, some provision aimed at protecting the warranty
expectations of consumers against misleading advertising is in
order. 62
58. Statement, supra note 14, at 7.
59. Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmak-
ing Power, 84 HARv. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Slawson].
60. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1791.2(a)(1) (West 1973). It has been suggested
that the buyer might try to invoke the Act's protection by demonstrating that
the advertising relied on was a "sample" of the product. California Consumer
Law Conference, supra note 17, at 176-77. It is unlikely, however, that any
court would be convinced by this argument.
61. It is a common procedure for sellers to insert in their form contracts
a clause such as this:
This instrument is a complete and exclusive statement of all the terms
of the agreement between the buyer and seller and of all the represen-
tations of the parties.
This is commonly referred to as a merger clause, and it poses no problem when
all of the express representations and warranties are actually set forth in the
written contract. Often there have been other representations not included in
the written instrument, and the consumer has failed to read or understand the
significance of the merger clause. Statement, supra note 14, at 2.
62. One of the proposals presented to the Senate Committee on Business and
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Disclaiming the Express Written Warranty
The disclaimer has been the seller's principal answer to the
warranty, whether express or implied. 3 By means of a dis-
claimer the seller seeks to limit the scope of his undertaking and
notify the buyer that his expectations should be modified.
64
"Freedom of contract" traditionally has provided the doctrinal
basis for the right to disclaim warranties.6"
Because an express warranty under the Commercial Code
need not be in writing,66 it was necessary for the draftsmen to
grapple with the problem of clauses in sales contracts seeking to
exclude warranties which might have arisen out of the oral dick-
ering between the parties.6 7  The product of the draftsmen's ef-
fort was an unfortunately worded section of the Commercial
Code. It provides that words tending to create an express war-
ranty, and words tending to limit or negate it, will be construed
Professions by the Statement of the Association of California Consumers, supra
note 14, at 7-18, calls for an addition of a new Chapter 5 to Part 3 of Division
7 of the Business and Professions Code, commencing with section 17910. Re-
garding advertising, Article III of the proposal reads as follows:
Section 17940. General Rule. No person shall advertise, offer,
publish or make a deceptive warranty, guaranty or other similar under-
taking.
Section 17941. Warranty of Merchantability. Any advertisement
of a warranty, guaranty or other similar undertaking shall conspicuously
disclose that the product is warranted to be merchantable.
Section 17942. Prohibition if Merchantability Warranty Modified.
No person shall advertise a warranty for the purpose or with the effect
of aiding in the consummation of a sale of a product in which the war-
ranty of merchantability is modified with respect to the product or any
component part thereof.
Section 17943. Express Warranty. No person shall advertise a
warranty under which the maker assumes or purports to assume any
warranty obligations to the buyer other than or in addition to those
existing under the warranty of merchantability, unless the advertise-
ment contains all the information required to be disclosed under Sec-
tions 17926 and 17941.
Section 17944. Terminology. The information required to be dis-
closed in an advertisement under this article shall be in the exact termi-
nology and shall comply with such other requirements (whether as to
positioning, style and size of type, color or disposition of lettering or
otherwise) as may be prescribed by regulations issued under this arti-
cle. Such regulations may require or prohibit disclosure in such writ-
ing of any additional information which in the judgment of the (super-
vising agency) is necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes or to
prevent circumvention or evasion of, or to facilitate compliance with,
the provisions of this chapter.
Id. at 12-13.
None of the proposals aimed specifically at the problem of misleading or
faulty advertising of warranties has yet been implemented by the legislature.
63. Comment, Limitations on Freedom to Modify Contract Remedies, 72
YALE L.J. 723, 725 (1963).
64. Id.
65. Comment, Restricting Disclaimer of the Warranty of Merchantability in
Consumer Sales: Proposed Alternatives to the UCC, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV.
895, 900 (1971).
66. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2313 (West 1964).
67. Id. Uniform Commercial Code Comment 1.
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as consistent when it is reasonable to do so, but that "subject to
the provisions of this division on parol or extrinsic evidence (Sec-
tion 2202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that
such construction is unreasonable."68 As one writer has put it,
this language "says nothing; it means nothing."6  The section was
apparently included to protect buyers from the "unexpected and
unbargained language of disclaimer by denying effect to such lan-
guage when inconsistent with language of express warranty ....
It means only that it is probably difficult-though not impossible
-to disclaim an express warranty under the Commercial Code.
Even though the Song-Beverly Act does not address itself to
disclaiming the express warranty, such a disclaimer would clearly
violate the spirit of the Act."' It is difficult to comprehend how
one could disclaim an express warranty under the Act without
also violating the provision against the waiving of rights under
the Act.72  Once an express warranty has been given which satis-
fies the definition under the Act, the provisions of the Act come
into play and the buyer immediately acquires rights under them.
There is no way a seller may then disclaim any part of the express
warranty he has given,73 since to elicit from the buyer a waiver
of his rights under the Act is specifically forbidden.74
THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY
The Song-Beverly Act makes one of its most important con-
tributions to consumer protection law by reviving the signifi-
cance of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for
purpose in the sale of consumer goods. The Commercial Code
recognizes the existence of implied warranties, 75 but their import
in the consumer arena has been undermined by the relative ease
with which the Commercial Code permits implied warranties to be
68. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2316(1) (West 1964).
69. Ezer, supra note 8, at 311.
70. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2316, Uniform Commercial Code Comment 1(West 1964). Since § 2313 of the Commercial Code permits oral express war-
ranties which are part of the basis of the bargain, the disclaimer problem arises
either when the consumer has been led to believe by advertising, sales bro-
chures, or oral communications by a salesman that there is more protection in
the warranty than actually appears in the signed contract, or when the written
instrument (if there is one) specifically excludes (as in a merger clause) prior
extrinsic communications. See note 61 supra.
71. California Consumer Law Conference, supra note 17, at 178.
72. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1790.1 (West 1973).
73. The absurdity of permitting a manufacturer or seller to warrant his prod-
uct in one clause of a written contract and to negate all or part of that warranty
in another clause should be obvious.
74. CAL. CrV. CODE § 1790.1 (West 1973).
75. CAL. COMM. CODE §§ 2314, 2315 (West 1964). Under section 2314
(implied warranty of merchantability) the seller must be a merchant with respect
to the goods sold if the warranty is to arise.
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disclaimed.7" Arguably a buyer's most important warranty
rights, even under the Commercial Code, are those arising out of
implied warranties. 77  Since these rights are broader and of po-
tentially greater significance to the consumer under the Act than
under the Commercial Code or case law, the strength of the
remedies available to him will often depend on the extent to
which he can show that his implied warranty rights have been
violated.7 8
A warranty is said to be implied when it arises by oper-
ation of law from the nature of a particular transaction.79  The
concept of an implied warranty developed from a recognized need
,to afford greater protection to 'buyers of goods of inferior qual-
ity."' The courts evidently felt that the express warranty, the
only one recognized at common law,8' was insufficient to afford
this protection, since its existence was primarily dependent upon
the initiative of the seller. The implied warranty of merchant-
ability thus arose out of the need to assure the buyer that even
without an express warranty the goods he purchased would meet
certain minimum standards of quality. 2
Creation of the Warranty
Under the Song-Beverly Act the implied warranty of mer-
chantability may arise by one of two methods, each correspond-
ing to the alternative definitions of "consumer goods."8" Section
76. See notes 95-99 and accompanying text infra.
77. Substantive Law Memo, supra note 23, at 34-35 citing J. WHITE & S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-6 (1972), wherein it is stated that
"[t]he implied warranty of merchantability . . . is by far the most important
warranty in the Code."
78. Substantive Law Memo, supra note 23, at 35.
79. Comment, Recent Developments, supra note 29, at 1431-32.
80. Comment, Song-Beverly, supra note 34, at 188.
81. Id.
82. The erosion of the doctrine of caveat emptor began in the landmark case
of Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (K.B. 1815), in which
the implied warranty of merchantability was first applied. Lord Ellenborough
described merchantability as the minimum quality a buyer could be expected to
tolerate in any product he buys:
I am under the opinion, however, that under such circumstances,
the purchaser has a right to expect a saleable article answering the
description in the contract. Without any particular warranty, there
is an implied term in every such contract. Where there is no oppor-
tunity to inspect the commodity, the maxim of caveat emptor does not
apply. He cannot without a warranty insist that it shall be of any
particular quality or fineness, but the intention of both parties must be
taken to be, that it shall be saleable in the market under the de-
nomination mentioned in the contract between them. The purchaser
cannot be supposed to buy goods to lay them on a dunghill.
171 Eng. Rep. at 47.
For a discussion of this and other cases involving a breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability, see Presser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable
Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117 (1943).
83. California Consumer Law Conference, supra note 17, at 188-89.
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1792 of the Act requires that " . . . every sale or consignment
for sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail in this state
shall be accompanied by the manufacturer's implied warranty that
the goods are merchantable." 4  Thus the implied warranty of
merchantability will arise either when the consumer good is a new
mobilehome, motor vehicle, machine, appliance, or like product
sold for personal, family or household uses, 5 or when it is any
other new good or product bought for personal, family, or house-
hold purposes, the retail sale of which is accompanied by an
express warranty.86
Although it is not clear how inclusive terms like appliance,
machine, or like product are meant to be,8 7 it would appear that
section 1792 is applicable to virtually all products which the av-
erage consumer might 'be expected to purchase for his personal
or 'household use and which by reason of their complicated de-
sign and mechanical or electrical parts are prone toward sudden
and inexplicable malfunction. The fact that household goods of
this sort are necessarily accompanied by the implied warranty of
merchantability is one of 'the most innovative features of the
Song-Beverly Act.88 This feature is of particular importance to
the consumer when the manufacturer attempts to disclaim any of
the implied warranties.8 9
The Act gives renewed vitality to the implied warranty of
merchantability in two ways. It imposes liability under this war-
ranty directly on the manufacturer, and it makes it both difficult
and commercially unwise for the manufacturer to disclaim the
warranty.
Liability of the Manufacturer under the Implied Warranty of
Merchantability
In deference to the notion that the seller should bear respon-
84. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1792 (West 1973).
85. Id. § 1791(a).
86. Id. Excluded from coverage under this section are soft goods and con-
sumables. For different rules concerning soft goods and consumables, built-in
heating and air conditioning units, and used goods, see CAL. CIV. CODE §§
1793.35, 1795.1, and 1795.5 (West 1973).
87. California Consumer Law Conference, supra note 17, at 188. In the
early case of Ross v. Tabor, 53 Cal. App. 605, 611, 200 P. 971, 973 (1921),
for example, the word "appliance" was construed very broadly to include "any-
thing that is used as a means to an end."
88. Senator Song's Explanation of SB 272, supra note 28, indicates that it
was the main thrust of the Act to insure the effectiveness of express warranties.
Section 1792 of the Civil Code was designed to provide the consumer with the
assurance that certain goods would be guaranteed to meet a minimum standard
of merchantability, even if they are not accompanied by an express warranty.
$9. See text accompanying note 1Q4 in/ra,
[Vol. 14
1974] SONG-BEVERLY CONSUMER WARRANTY ACT 591
sibility for any defective goods he sells,90 the draftsmen of the
Commercial Code adopted the implied warranty of merchanta-
bility.9 ' However, the Commercial Code sets limitations on the ap-
plicability of this warranty, which the Song-Beverly Act has cor-
rected in order to insure the warranty's usefulness to the consu-
mer.92 Under the Commercial Code the implied warranty of
merchantability arises in a contract for the sale of goods "if the
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind."93  Li-
ability under the warranty thus depends upon privity of contract
between seller and buyer.
The Song-Beverly Act fixes responsibility for its implied war-
ranty of merchantability directly upon the manufacturer, even
though he may not be in privity of contract with the consumer.
In abolishing the necessity of privity of contract for the implied
warranty of merchantability94 the Act imposes ultimate responsi-
90. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L.
REv. 117, 122 (1943).
91. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2314 (West 1964). Section 2314(2) of the Code
provides that for goods to be merchantable they must be at least such as:
(a) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract descrip-
tion; and
(b) In the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality
within the description; and
(c) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) Run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality, and quantity within each unit and among all units in-
volved; and
(e) Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agree-
ment may require; and
(f) Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label, if any.
92. The Commercial Code's implied warranty of merchantability is function-
ally identical with the Song-Beverly's. Compare CAL. COMM. CODE § 2314
(West 1964), with CAL. Civ. CODE § 1791.1 (West 1973), which states that for
goods to be merchantable they must be such as:
(1) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract descrip-
tion.
. (2) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used.
(3) Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled.
(4) Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label.
Note that under the Act adequate packaging and labeling are absolute require-
ments for merchantability.
93. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2314 (West 1964).
94. See Thornton, The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act: New Com-
mandments for Manufacturers, 46 L.A. BAR BULL. 331 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Thornton]. See also Comment, Song-Beverly, supra note 34, at 196 & n. 100,
wherein it is suggested that the language of section 1792 of the Civil Code is
broad enough to extend the manufacturer's warranty to any user or consumer.
California had already abolished the requirement of privity of contract to
recover for a personal injury resulting from a defective product. Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963). See also Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
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bility for the quality of the goods upon the one who has caused
them to be placed on the market. It may reasonably be ex-
pected that this responsibility will result in greater care taken in
the manufacture of many consumer items.
Disclaiming the Implied Warranty of Merchantability
Although the Commercial Code provides for the implied
warranty of merchantability in a contract for the sale of goods, 5
the Code contains a loophole which has permitted the exclusion
of all implied warranties by the use of expressions like "as is,"
"with all faults," or similar language which in "common under-
standing" clearly notifies the buyer that the basic implied war-
ranties have been disclaimed. 6 A comment to section 2316 of
the Commercial Code97 explains that the phrases "as is," "with
all faults," and the ,like are commonly understood in the com-
mercial world to mean that the buyer accepts the entire risk as to
the quality of the goods involved. This seems fair enough where
buyer and seller are presumably acquainted with the common
parlance of business transactions and sophisticated enough to
comprehend the niceties of contract language.98 But when, as
often happens, the seller includes a clause in an express war-
ranty under which a consumer "agrees" to surrender the basic im-
plied warranties, he effectively renders nugatory the law of mer-
chantability. 99
Consumer), 69 YJE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MrNN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
95. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2314 (West 1964). "Goods" in this section in-
cludes "food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere."
96. Id. § 2316(3)(a).
97. Id. § 2316, Uniform Commercial Code Comment 7.
98. Section 2316(2) of the Commercial Code requires that the seller who
seeks to exclude the implied warranty of merchantability must, if by a writing,
make his disclaimer "conspicuous," and he must mention "merchantibility."
"Conspicuous" is not defined, and the Code necessarily presumes that any buyer
knows the legal definition of merchantability. Section 2316(2) also provides
that the implied warranty of fitness for purpose may be disclaimed by general
language, but to do so a writing is necessary. See CAL. COMM. CODE § 2316,
Uniform Commercial Code Comment 4 (West 1964).
99. Statement, supra note 14, at 1. Typical of such clauses is one repro-
duced in Professor Mueller's article, supra note 1, at 581 & n.24:
This product is precision built, inspected and tested before leaving our
factory. It is guaranteed against defects in materials and workmanship
for one year, cord set and plastic container excluded. If found defec-
tive it must promptly be returned post-paid to the factory or an author-
ized service station, not to the dealer [emphasis in original], and it willbe repaired without charge. It is expressly agreed that our total lia-bility is limited to such repair [emphasis added]. If used according
to instructions, it should give years of satisfactory service.
Professor Mueller admits that a repair and replacement clause such as this is a
... superb product. For by generously admitting a sole (and mini-
real) obligation to keep trying until the promised defect-free product
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The Song-Beverly Act makes one of its most significant con-
tributions to consumer protection law by addressing itself to the
practice of disclaiming implied warranties. It sets forth a strict
procedure which must be followed if an effective disclaimer is to
be made. Two methods are available for disclaiming the war-
ranty. Whether one method or the other is used depends on the
circumstances under which the implied warranty could have arisen.
If it arose out of a sale of goods covered by the Act, 00 to disclaim
the warranty the manufacturer must comply with the requirement
that a writing be
attached to the goods which, clearly informs the buyer, prior
to the sale, in simple and concise language each of the fol-
lowing:
(1) The goods are being sold on an "as is" or "with all
faults" basis.
(2) The entire risk as to the quality and performance of
the goods is with the buyer.
(3) Should the goods prove defective following their pur-
chase, the buyer and not 'the manufacturer, distributor, or
retailer assumes the entire cost of all necessary servicing or
repair.101
The purpose of this procedure is to delineate for the buyer exactly
what has been disclaimed and on whom rests the responsibility
for remedying defects. Because the expressions "as is" or
"with all faults" are not sufficient alone to disclaim the implied
warranty of merchantability under the Act, the buyer is afforded
a fairer opportunity to understand the extent of his implied war-
ranty protection than he is under the Commercial Code.' °2
The second method by which the manufacturer may disclaim
the implied warranty of merchantability is to be inferred from
section 1793 of the Act.103  This section prohibits manufacturers
or sellers who make express warranties from disclaiming the ap-
plicable implied warranties. Thus, if the implied warranty is one
is delivered it continues to deny--either expressly or by necessary impli-
cation-all other responsibility. And it does all of this in a virtuous
and reassuring tone that is much appreciated by sales managers.
Id. at 581-82.
100. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1791(a) (West 1973).
101. Id. § 1792.4(a).
102. In Hurd & Bush, supra note 6, at 41, the point is made that, notwith-
standing the Act's requirement that the disclaimer be made by a "conspicuous
writing" containing the necessary disclaimer language, the consumer will likely
be unaware of the significance of the "as is" language. This perhaps is an unfair
evaluation of section 1792.4. It is precisely because consumers are not likely
to be familiar with the legal significance of the "as is" sale that the Act requires
strict adherence to the three-step method of disclaiming implied warranties.
103. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1793 (West 1973).
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which would arise only by virtue of the presence of an express
warranty, the only way the manufacturer may disclaim it is by not
giving the express warranty. 10 4
These provisions should work to the advantage of the con-
sumer. No longer are manufacturers permitted to couple express
warranties with disclaimers of implied warranties.0 They are
put to the choice 'between selling goods minus all warranties-a
decision which will do little to enhance customer confidence and
much to diminish the value of warranty advertising-or living
with the implied warranty of merchantability so eagerly dis-
claimed in the past.106
A question arises as to the effect of these provisions on the
warranty practices of manufacturers of certain consumer items.
For example, it is quite common for a manufacturer to expressly
warrant only part of the product he turns out, 07 and nothing in
the Act prohibits this practice. Any part "0I which is expressly
warranted will then automatically be accompanied by the implied
warranty of merchantability. 10 9  Since "manufacturer" under the
104. If an express warranty is given which is successfully waived or negated,
then any implied warranty arising with it would probably vaporize. California
Consumer Law Conference, supra note 17, at 190-91. But see text accompany-
ing notes 63-74 supra.
105. Compare CAL. Cv. CODE § 1793 (West 1973), with CAL. COMM. CODE§ 2316 (West 1964) (wherein disclaimers of implied warranties are permitted
when an express warranty is given) and CAL. COMM. CODE § 2317(c) (wherein
the express warranty is permitted to displace the implied warranty of merchant-
ability when the two are inconsistent).
Unfortunately there is little evidence that manufacturers are complying with
the letter of section 1793 of the Civil Code. For example, the express warrantygiven by the International Harvester Company on its 1973 three-quarter ton
pickup truck, sold in California, still came with a clause reading as follows:
THIS WARRANTY IS IN LIEU OF ALL OTHER WARRANTIES,
EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITA-TION, WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSE ....
International Harvester Co. Warranty, 1973, copy on file with the Santa Clara
Lawyer.
106. Thornton, supra note 94, at 333.
107. The partial express warranty is perhaps most widely used in the automo-bile industry. Anyone who has observed, for example, the American Motors
Corporation TV commercial extolling the virtues of the A.M.C. "Buyer Protec-
tion Plan" is aware of the specific exclusion of tires from coverage under this
warranty. Other auto manufacturers are even less generous with the scope of
their express warranties. The Chrysler Corporation, for example, exempts eleven
"items" not normally considered defects in materials or workmanship from cov-
erage under its 1972 passenger car warranty. Chrysler Corporation's Warranty
and Limitation of Liability for New 1972 Model Passenger Cars, copy on file
with the Santa Clara Lawyer.
For a thorough treatment of the shortcomings in automobile warranty pro-
tection in recent years see FTC, REPORT ON AUTOMOBILE WARRANTIES (1970).108. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1791(a) (West 1973) includes any "part thereof" in
its definition of "consumer goods."
109. 1d. § 1792.
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Act includes anyone who assembles consumer goods,"' it may
be illegal for any manufacturer to disclaim or limit the implied
warranty of merchantability as to any parts which he assembles
but which do not carry his express warranty."' This interpre-
tation is consistent with the intent of the legislature to insure that
the consumer can turn to someone within California in whom
responsibility is reposed for the entire product."
2
Duration of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability
Because the implied warranty of merchantability has been
so often disclaimed, there is a dearth of case law concerning how
a ,breach may occur, at least in regard to consumer goods. 1 3  Ob-
viously, if the new toaster fails to toast or the new tire explodes
for no apparent reason, a presumption arises that these goods
were not of merchantable quality. Every case, however, is not
that clear, and proving when or how a warranty was breached
is often difficult. The Act makes one potentially significant con-
tribution toward solving this problem by prescribing the du-
ration of the implied warranty." 4  If the implied warranty of
merchantability accompanies an express warranty, they will be of
equal duration, so long as this is a reasonable time. In no
event will the implied warranty endure less than sixty days nor
more than one year following the sale of new consumer goods."'
Significantly, the Commercial Code makes no express provi-
sion for the duration of any implied warranty beyond the time
of sale." ' The Song-Beverly Act, on the other hand, holds the
110. Id. § 1791(c).
111. California Consumer Law Conference, supra note 17, at 183.
112. See Thornton, supra note 94, at 333. The "someone" in this case would
be the manufacturer's established repair facility or authorized service center in
California or the merchant (dealer) who sold the defective item. See text ac-
companying notes 130-184 infra.
113. Cases such as Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d
1041 (1954) and Moore v. Hubbard & Johnson Lumber Co., 149 Cal. App. 2d
236, 308 P.2d 794 (1957), have granted relief for breach of implied warranties
of merchantability where the goods were found not to be reasonably suitable for
the ordinary uses and purposes of goods of the general type described by the
terms of the sale. A similar position was taken in Eichler Homes, Inc. v. Ander-
son, 9 Cal. App. 3d 224, 87 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1970). None of these cases, how-
ever, involved a sale of consumer goods as defined in the Song-Beverly Act. Yet
another reason for the paucity of consumer cases brought for breach of an im-
plied warranty of merchantability has been a general "lack of consumer power
in cases involving no great monetary damage" to the individual. Mueller, supra
note 1, at 596.
114. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1791.1(c) (West 1973).
115. Where an express warranty accompanies used goods, a shorter dura-
tion-not less than 30 days nor more than 3 months-is prescribed for the im-
plied warranty of merchantability. Id. § 1795.5(c).
116. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2314 (West 1964). But see text accompanying
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manufacturer or seller liable for a prospective breach of the im-
plied warranty of merchantability, just as it does for a prospec-
tive 'breach of an express warranty.' 17  This is a major develop-
ment in the law of merchantability. Now the consumer is pro-
tected against a subsequent defect which he could not reasonably
have been expected to discover at the time of sale.' 8  Because
appellate courts have had to deal only infrequently with breaches
of implied warranties in consumer sales (except where physical
injuries have occurred), the question remains open whether the
Act will have a significant effect upon the practices of manufac-
turers with regard -to honoring and disclaiming the warranty of
merchantability. 19
The Implied Warranty of Fitness for Purpose
This warranty, as defined in the Song-Beverly Act, is virtually
identical with its counterpart in the Commercial Code. 20 The
warranty arises when the retailer, distributor, or manufacturer has
reason to know the particular purpose for which the consumer
goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the skill andjudgment of the seller to select and furnish suitable goods. 2' For
example, when a buyer purchases an electric shaver, it will nor-
mally be accompanied by an implied warranty that it is fit for
the ordinary purposes to which such items are put" 2'-that is,
shaving human beings. However, if the buyer has indicated to
the seller that he wants a shaver suitable for trimming his dog's
hair, and the buyer is relying on the seller's judgment to provide
him with an instrument fit for that purpose, then the shaver will
be accompanied by that implied warranty of fitness for purpose.
This will occur even though the particular purpose is not one
for which electric shavers of the type described are ordinarily
used.
The Act further provides that when a manufacturer does have
reason to know of the buyer's purpose and reliance at the time of
notes 47-52 supra. The cases discussed therein concerned both express and im-
lied warranties.
117. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1791.1(c) (West 1973).
118. If the case of Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 35 Cal. App. 3d 948, 111 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1973), is deemed applicable to
the sale of consumer goods, the buyer may also be protected against defects dis-
covered after the expiration of the warranty period.
119. It is clear that the Act has had little effect on methods used by some
manufacturers to disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability. See note 105
supra.
120. Compare CAL. CiV. CODE § 1791.1(b) (West 1973), with CAL. COMM.
CODE § 2315 (West 1964).
121. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1792.1(b) (West 1973).
122. Id. § 1791.1. See also CA,.. CIv. CODE § 1792 (West 1973).
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the retail sale, the implied warranty of fitness necessarily accom-
panies a sale of such goods at retail by the manufacturer.2 ' The
language of this section seems to imply that in order for the manu-
facturer to become liable for the implied warranty of fitness for
purpose, he must also be the one who sells the item at retail.
However, in view of the section which immediately follows,' 24
this interpretation is illogical. In the subsequent section the
Act provides that the implied warranty of fitness for purpose nec-
essarily accompanies the sale of consumer goods by a retailer
or distributor who has the requisite knowledge of the consumer's
purpose and reliance on his skill and judgment. If the manu-
facturer must also retail the goods in order to be liable under the
warranty of fitness, then the preceding section is superfluous, its
provisions being subsumed in section 1792.2. Presupposing
that section 1792.1 must have been intended to contribute some-
thing to the Act, it can only be concluded that the manufacturer
will be liable if he has reason to know of the buyer's purpose and
reliance at the time of sale, even if he does not retail the goods
himself. A manufacturer who advertises a particular use for the
goods he sells should become liable for the implied warranty of
fitness for that purpose, even if the purpose advertised is not
an "ordinary" one for goods of that description.2 5
The Act is silent as to what constitutes sufficient notice to
the seller or manufacturer of the particular use the buyer has in
mind for the goods. Likewise, the Commercial Code does not
set forth specific provisions for imparting notice, but in a
comment to section 2-315 the view is expressed that the buyer
need not convey to the seller actual knowledge of his purpose or
reliance on the seller's skill and judgment, so long as these may
reasonably be inferred from the circumstances.' 26 Thus, in the
shaver example, if the manufacturer advertised that his product
may be used for any one of a number of purposes, it would
not be unfair to impute constructive knowledge that the buyer
had one of these purposes in mind and relied on the manufac-
turer's skill and judgment to create a suitable produot. Like-
wise, if the buyer indicates to the seller that he wants a product
which will perform task A, the seller will become liable under the
implied warranty of fitness for purpose if he represents that prod-
123. Id. § 1792.1.
124. Id. § 1792.2.
125. Clearly the manufacturer has "reason to know" of the buyer's purpose
and reliance when his own advertising is used to create the purpose and induce
the reliance.
126. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2315, Uniform Commercial Code Comment 1
(West 1964).
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uct X will do the job, even if the manufacturer's brochure adver-
tises that product X is suitable only for tasks B, C, and D.
In summary, the Song-Beverly Act does not greatly change
the law with respect to the implied warranty of fitness for pur-
pose. However, by making applicable to this warranty the
same provisions respecting duration,"' method of disclaiming,1 2
and damages for breach 129 as are applicable to the warranty of
merchantability, the Act gives added vitality to the implied war-
ranty of fitness for purpose in the sale of consumer goods.
THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE WARRANTOR UNDER THE
SONG-BEVERLY ACT
When a consumer buys a product he naturally expects to re-
ceive a certain degree of satisfaction from it. If the product is
designed to perform a certain function, he is entitled to expect
satisfactory performance for a reasonable amount of time. A
written warranty, to the consumer, is an insurance policy-which
he hopes never to use. He may even prefer not to think about it
when making his purchase (and the seller doubtless will not en-
courage him to do otherwise). But when the product breaks
down, the frustrated consumer will likely turn to his "insurance
policy" to read, probably for the first time, about his obligations
and those of the manufacturer or seller. Often the consumer will be
shocked to discover that in order to have the product repaired,
he will have to bear the cost of shipping it hundreds-perhaps
thousands-of miles -to the manufacturer's home office. He may
also learn to his dismay that the actual obligations of the warrantor
are so minimal as to be of no real value. The Song-Beverly Act
attempts to deal with these frustrating realities by establishing and
clarifying minimum obligations for all warrantors under various
types of warranties, and by providing remedies to the consumer
-for a violation of these obligations.
Obligations and Remedies under the Express Warranty
The Act does not oblige the manufacturer to give express
warranties, but if he does, he is faced with the obligation to set
forth the terms of the warranty in clear, readily understandable
language, and to clearly identify himself as the warrantor. 1 0
The manufacturer is then faced with a choice between maintain-
127. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1791.1(c) (West 1973).
128. Id. §§ 1792.3, 1792.4(a).
129. Id. § 1791.1(d).
130. Id. § 1793.1(a) (West Supp. 1974),
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ing his own service and repair facilities within California'' or
reimbursing retailers on whom he must rely to repair, replace,
or refund the purchase price under the warranty.' 32
If the manufacturer chooses to set up his own system of re-
pair facilities, these must be fully equipped to repair or service
the malfunctioning whole or part of the goods expressly war-
ranted.' 33 The warranty work done in these facilities must
commence within a reasonable time, and unless the buyer agrees
in writing to the contrary, the goods must be made to "conform
to the applicable express warrant[y]" within thirty days.' 34
If the manufacturer's facility cannot effect the necessary re-
pairs, the 'manufacturer is duty-bound either to replace the goods
or to refund the purchase price.' 35 In imposing upon the manu-
facturer who gives an express warranty the legal obligation to
choose one of only two ways by which he can honor the warranty,
the Act makes its most significant contribution to the law of
sales warranty.136 The consumer now has at his disposal a body
of law designed specifically to insure that the warranty to repair,
replace, or refund has real value, not just advertising value.
13 7
The buyer is not without his own obligations. He must de-
liver the defective goods to one of the service facilities, unless to
do so would be unreasonable in view of the size, weight, method
of installation or attachment, or nature of the defect.' 3 ' If such
131. Id. § 1793.2 (West 1973). CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.1(b) (West Supp.
1974) provides in part that if the manufacturer elects to maintain his own serv-
ice facilities in California, he must, at the time of sale, provide the buyer with
(1) the name and address of each in-state repair facility, or (2) the name, ad-
dress and telephone number of a service and repair facility central directory
within California or the toll-free telephone number of such central directory lo-
cated out of state, or (3) maintain with the retail sellers of his warranted goods
a current listing of either the authorized in-state service and repair facility or
retail sellers to whom the consumer goods are to be returned for service and re-
pair.
132. Id. § 1793.5 (West 1973).
133. The manufacturer is not liable for defects caused by the buyer's unau-
thorized or unreasonable use of the goods following sale. Id. § 1794.3.
134. Id. § 1793.2(b). The thirty-day period may be extended by conditions
causing delay which were "beyond the control of the manufacturer or its repre-
sentative in this state." Id.
135. Id. § 1793.2(d). This section also provides that the manufacturer may
deduct from any refund "that amount directly attributable to use by the buyer
prior to the discovery of the nonconformity." The potential for abuse by manu-
facturers in such a provision should be obvious.
136. The value of this contribution is enhanced by the requirement that the
express warranty be honored in timely fashion.
137. For an interesting and lively discussion of the contract as a commodity
itself, which suggests that there may be developing a law of merchantability with
respect to the drafting of contracts and the warranties they contain, see Leff,
Contract as a Thing, 19 AM. U.L. REV. 131 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Leff].
138. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1793.2(c) (West 1973).
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delivery is unreasonable, the buyer must notify the manufacturer
in writing. The latter may then choose to repair the goods on the
buyer's premises or pay to have them shipped to the repair facil-
ity.
How much effort the manufacturer must expend in establish-
ing repair facilities is not clear from the Act. It says only that
every manufacturer of consumer goods sold in California, who
gives an express warranty, shall "maintain or cause to be main-
tained ...sufficient service and repair facilities to carry out the
terms of such warranties .. . ."I" Manufacturers are permitted
to select certain retailers and dealers from among those who sell
their products to handle warranty work. 140 This permits flexibil-
ity in deciding how to effect warranty repairs. However, smaller
companies which do not already have a system of authorized re-
pair facilities might be at a disadvantage in having to deal with a
large number of independent retailers.
The requirement that "sufficient service and repair facilities"
be maintained poses a problem of interpretation. If "suffici-
cient" means sufficiently dispersed throughout the state, then a
consumer in San Francisco who purchases a product, the nearest
repair facility for which is in San Diego, may have a just complaint
that the existing service facilities are insufficient. However, if
"sufficient" means enough facilities to handle all of the warranty
work, then the fact that most facilities are located in the large
metropolitan areas will not necessarily mean that they are insuf-
ficient, even for a remote rural buyer. Since the Act acknowl-
edges that the buyer may have to send the defective goods to
the repair facility at his own expense, 4' it is reasonable to assume
that "sufficient" refers to quantity and not dispersion of repair
facilities. 4 2  The buyer who is understandably reluctant to ship
the goods hundreds of miles at his own expense may be justi-
139. Id. § 1793.2(a)(1).
140. Explanation, supra note 28, at 1. The Explanation affirms the procedure
already used by manufacturers such as R.C.A., Sony, Sunbeam, and others who
have established "authorized service facilities." Manufacturers such as these, Sen-
ator Song explains, will not have to "rent one foot of space or ...hire one
employee." Id.
141. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1793.2(c), 1793.3(c) (West 1973). In each of
these sections the buyer's duty to return the nonconforming goods to the manu-
facturer's service and repair facility is set forth. The manufacturer is obligated
to bear the cost of shipping the goods to the repair facilitiy only when the buyer
is "unable to effect return" (for reasons of size, weight, method of attachment
or installation, or nature of the nonconformity) and after he has notified the
manufacturer of the nonconformity. Thus the purchaser of a defective steam
iron or other small appliance will not reasonably be permitted to claim that he
is "unable to effect return" and will have to bear the cost of shipment himself.
142. California Consumel Law Conference, supra note 17, at 181-82.
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fied in feeling that the Act has failed in its essential purpose."'4
If the manufacturer declines to establish a system of repair
facilities, he is obligated to reimburse any retailer who sells his
goods for the costs borne by the retailer in giving effect to the
manufacturer's express warranty. 144  The buyer has two options
in this situation. He may return the defective goods to the origi-
nal seller,' 45 or he may return them to any retail seller in Califor-
nia who carries like goods of the same manufacturer.' 46 The'
party chosen by the buyer to honor the warranty has the option
of repairing or replacing the goods. If he opts to repair, he must
commence work within a reasonable time and complete the re-
pairs within thirty days, unless the buyer waives this requirement
in writing. 147  If the seller attempts to repair the goods and finds
that he is unable to do so, he must refund the purchase price to
the buyer, less depreciation for the buyer's use.' 48
This option arrangement raises several problems. First, the
Act provides that the thirty-day repair limit may be extended by
conditions "beyond the control of the retail seller or his represen-
tative," 149 but it offers no clue to the meaning of "beyond the
control." Since the thrust of the provisions dealing with service
facilities and repairs by sellers is that the goods are to be made
to conform as quickly as possible to the manufacturer's warran-
ties,'50 the provisions for delay should be narrowly interpre-
ted and should be applied only where it would be grossly unfair
not to do so.
A second problem is found in the waiver provision. The
Act generally disapproves of any attempt by manufacturers or
sellers to limit, modify, or disclaim any warranty provisions. Par-
ticularly forbidden is the surprise disclaimer or unclear provi-
143. It is also possible for the consumer to be misled by the manufacturer's
warranty card into believeing that he must bear the cost himself of shipping a
defective product to an out-of-state facility for repairs. Hurd & Bush, supra note
6, at 40-41. This possibility serves to emphasize the need for a provision in
the Act requiring warrantors to inform consumers of their rights under the Act.
See notes 185-91 and accompanying text intra.
144. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1793.5 (West 1973).
145. Id. § 1793.3(a). Since "retail seller" is defined under section 1791(e)
to include "any individual, partnership, corporation ...which engages in" sell-
ing consumer goods to retail buyers, it may be possible for the buyer to return
the goods to any outlet of the same retail chain.
146. Id. § 1793.3(b). If the buyer is unable to return the goods, the retailer,
upon receiving written notice to this effect, must bear the cost of shipping or
of repairing at the buyer's residence. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1793.3(c) (West 1973);
see also note 141 supra.
147. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1793.4 (West 1973).
148. Id. § 1793.3(a). See note 135 supra.
149. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1793.4 (West 1973).
150. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1793.2(b), 1793.4 (West 1973).
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sion by which a buyer unknowingly agrees to waive his rights to
speedy repair. This would be a violation of section 1790.1, since
any contract clause which intentionally obscures what the buyer
is waiving would clearly not be one of the waivers expressly pro-
vided for in the Act.' 5 '
One of the unique features of the Act-and one which en-
hances its viability-is the provision requiring manufacturers who
choose not to maintain their own repair facilities to be liable to
their retailers for the fair market value of express warranty
work.' 52  Retailers, confident that they will be paid the going
rate for repairs .by an established firm, will not hesitate to accept
warranty work. Manufacturers will be less likely to delay reim-
bursing a retailer, himself an experienced businessman, than they
would be to satisfy the isolated claims of frustrated consumers.
The Act firmly establishes the manufacturer's liability for his
own express warranties; evasion of this responsibility is theoret-
ically no longer possible.
There are some uncertainties in ,the Act which must be clari-
fied if the consumer is to know exactly where he stands with re-
gard to an express warranty. In his article Professor Mueller indi-
cated that the typical repair-or-replace warranty usually meant
that
what a consumer really buys from his dealer is not a properly
operating TV, stereo, dishwasher, or car. He buys a prom-
ised opportunity to get one sooner or later if in the meantime
he cooperates with the manufacturer-wholesaler-dealer es-
tablishment. 1153
The Act attempts to deal with this problem by requiring that re-
pairs or replacement be made within thirty days. 54 However,
the Act does not specifically command that if the goods are not
repaired within that time they must be replaced or the purchase
price refunded. Rather the mandate for replacement or refund
arises only if the manufacturer or retailer is unable to repair the
goods within the thirty-day period. 15 The result is that unless
the individual charged with repair admits that he cannot effect a
permanent repair, the buyer may be subject to limitless delays
on the supposition that the serviceman is able to repair and only
"one more adjustment" is necessary.'56  Under recent case law a
151. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1790.1 (West 1973), which deems such waivers
to be contrary to public policy, unenforceable and void. See also Comment,
Song-Beverly, supra note 34, at 199.
152. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.5 (West 1973).
153. Mueller, supra note 1, at 582. See also note 99 supra.
154. CAL. CIv. CODE 9H 1793.2(b), 1793.4 (West 1973).
155. Id. §H 1793.2(d), 1793.3(a).
156. California Consumer Law Conference, supra note 17, at 184-85.
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failure to effect repairs under a warranty may result in the war-
rantor's liability for damages flowing naturally from the breach, 157
but what the consumer wants in most instances is a properly
functioning product, not damages.
This construction, permitting the serviceman to continue to
attempt repairs on the claim that he is able to fix the product,
does not square well with the thirty-day requirement. That such
a loophole should appear to exist in view of the Act's intent to
insure that warranties will be honored is unfortunate. After a
reasonable time, an inability to repair the goods should become
obvious; when this occurs, it should 'be incumbent upon the repair
facility or dealer to admit it and to replace the goods or refund
the buyer's money. The expressed supplemental nature of the
Act' 58 makes it possible to apply other doctrines of law to fill ap-
parent gaps in the Act's coverage and to close loopholes. In this
instance it might be appropriate to apply the rule, codified in
section 1657 of the California Civil Code, that where no time
for performance is specified in a contract, a reasonable time is al-
lowed. 15 19 By definition an express warranty is made part of a
contract for sale, and the buyer has every right to expect that the
aleatory performance he has bargained for will be carried out
within a reasonable time.'60 If it is not, then a fortiori the
buyer has the right of replacement or refund purported to exist
when the warrantor is "unable" to repair.' 6 '
Another doctrine that may aid the consumer faced with
service delay tactics is the maxim of jurisprudence which de-
mands that interpretation-whether of statute or contract-be
reasonable. 6 2  It has been held in California that where the pur-
pose of a statute is apparent, a court will not blindly follow the
letter of the law where to do so would be inconsistent with the
primary intention of the legislature. 63 It is clear the legislature
did not intend to permit escape routes by which manufacturers or
157. See notes 49-51 and accompanying text supra.
158. See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
159. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1657 (West 1973). What constitutes a reasonable
time is always a question of fact. Palmquist v. Palmquist, 212 Cal. App. 2d 322,
27 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1963). In order to place the manufacturer or retailer in
default for failing to make repairs or replacement within a reasonable time, the
buyer may be required to demand performance first. World Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Kurtz Co., 183 Cal. App. 2d 319, 6 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1960).
160. The buyer has this right even though he is not in privity of contract with
the manufacturer. See note 94 supra.
161. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2(d) (West 1973).
162. Id. § 3542 (West 1970).
163. Jordt v. California State Bd. of Educ., 35 Cal. App. 2d 591, 595, 96 P.2d
809, 811 (1939). Accord, Estate of Wilcox, 68 Cal. App. 780, 784, 158 P.2d
32, 34 (1945); Kauke v. Lindsay Unified School Dist., 46 Cal. App. 2d 176,
185, 115 P.2d 576, 581 (1941).
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dealers could avoid their duties to consumers under the Song-
Beverly Act.
The ultimate question for the consumer is what to do when
someone-manufacturer, retailer or other warrantor-has evaded
his responsibilities under an express warranty. All the consumer
knows is that the product he purchased is now defective, and, al-
though accompanied by a warranty to repair or replace, it is
not being fixed. If the manufacturer has elected to provide serv-
ice and repair facilities, the buyer will have been informed of the
names and locations of such facilities.' 6 4  Under these circum-
stances the buyer's claim is clearly against the manufacturer if the
repair or replacement provisions of the Act have been violated.
But if the manufacturer has elected to reimburse the retailer for
warranty work, does the buyer have an immediate claim against
the manufacturer if the retailer fails to honor his obligation? The
Act is not absolutely clear on this point.
The possibility always exists that the manufacturer or seller
charged with duties under the warranty will simply refuse or oth-
erwise evidence his unwillingness to carry them out. This would
be a willful violation of the Act, for which treble damages may
be awarded, 6 ' unless, as the seller or manufacturer might argue,
the Act imposes sanctions only for a violation of its own provi-
sions, not for a violation of the terms of a particular warranty.
The Act, however, establishes definite and minimum procedural
requirements which must be adhered to by anyone giving an ex-
press warranty on consumer goods.' 6  Where the terms of a
particular express warranty relate to the future utility of perform-
ance of the product, they necessarily set into operation the provi-
sions of the Act respecting the duty to repair, replace, or refund,
167
which constitute the procedural requirements to which the warrantor
must adhere. It follows that the 'buyer should be able to sue the
warrantor under the Act for a breach of any terms of the warranty,
such as those respecting the duty to repair, replace, or refund,
which are also covered under the Act's procedural requirements.
Additionally, the buyer should have a claim against the manufac-
turer, who is the real warrantor, even if the unwillingness or re-
fusal to repair is evidenced by the retailer designated to perform the
warranty work.
164. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.1(b) (West 1973). See also CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1793.3. The Act does not require the manufacturer to notify the buyer that
he does not maintain his own system of repair facilities within California. Per-
haps the legislature assumed that this would not be necessary, since the buyer's
natural inclination upon finding that the product he bought has a defect is to
return it to the dealer with whom he has had direct contact.
165. Id. § 1794(a).
166. Id. §§ 1793.1, 1793.2, 1793.3, 1793.35, 1793.4, 1793.5.
167. Id. §§ 1793.2, 1793.3.
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Given the proper construction, the Act can also be looked
to for damages. The only section dealing specifically with that
issue provides for treble damages for a willful violation of any
provision in the Act.'6 8  It cannot reasonably be concluded that
this section was meant to foreclose the possibility of collecting
damages for a non-willful violation of the Act.'0 9 Rather it is
logical to presume that the section was added to provide stiff pen-
alties for a flagrant disregard of legislative intent, while permit-
ting recovery of ordinary damages under other doctrines of law
or statutes.170
To the extent that the Act creates certain minimum proce-
dural obligations for the manufacturer (and, where applicable,
the retail merchant) under an express warranty the consumer is
in a better position than he was under the Commercial Code. To
the extent that the Act may be interpreted to subject the manufac-
turer giving an express warranty to certain minimum legal require-
ments apart from the bare terms of the warranty, the consumer
has won a major round in his fight to obtain equal footing in
the marketplace.
The Obligations under the Implied Warranties
The Song-Beverly Act's treatment of buyers' rights under
the implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for purpose
fails to make provision for honoring these warranties. The man-
ufacturer's duty to repair or reimburse the retailer for the war-
ranty work he performs pertains only to the "applicable express
warranties."'' To obtain redress for a breach of implied war-
168. id. § 1794(a). Section 1794(b) permits reasonable attorney fees as well
as treble damages. It also limits the application of the treble damage provision
to judgments not based solely on a breach of the implied warranties of merchant-
ability or fitness for purpose.
169. But see California Consumer Law Conference, supra note 17, at 186.
170. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 3281 et seq. (West 1970). See also Laczko
v. Jules Meyers, Inc., 276 Cal. App. 2d 293, 295, 80 Cal. Rptr. 798, 799 (1969).
In that case the court spoke of the doctrine of "tort in essence", which confers
a private right of action for damages upon a person injured as a result of the
violation of a statute embodying a public policy, even though no specific civil
remedy is provided in the statute. In such an action the measure of damages is
normally that amount which will compensate for all the detriment proximately
caused by the breach, whether it could have been anticipated or not. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3333 (West 1970). Where the breach of the statutory duty is material,
the consumer should have the option to cancel the entire transaction. See CAL.
Civ. CODE § 1689(b)(2) (failure of consideration) and (b)(6) (prejudice to the
public interest) (West 1973). When the product is seriously defective, cancella-
tion of the transaction may be the consumer's only effective remedy. If there is
a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, the Commercial Code pro-
visions on revocation of acceptance and cancellation may be applicable. CAL.
COMM. CODE §§ 2608 and 2711(1) (West 1964).
171. CAL. Crv. CoDE §§ 1793.2, 1793.3, 1793.5 (West 1973).
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ranties, the buyer is referred to the general remedies for breach
of contract under sections 2601 through 2616 and 2701 through
2725 of the California Commercial Code.1 72  Among the buyer's
remedies are the following:
(1) he may retain the unmerchantable or unsuitable goods and
recover damages for breach; 173 or
(2) he may reject or revoke acceptance of the goods, cancel
the contract, and recover "so much of the price as has been paid"
plus incidental or consequential damages.' 74
The buyer may also recover reasonable attorney fees in a success-
ful action for breach of an implied warranty.' 70
When the obligation under an implied warranty falls on
someone other than the seller, the buyer may retain the non-con-
forming goods and sue the obligor for damages, as in (1) above.
But may he alternatively cancel the contract, return the goods to
the seller and demand refund as in (2) above, even though the
implied warranty obligation is that of the manufacturer? It has
been suggested that an affirmative answer to this question is im-
plicit in the Act.' 70  This implication arises out of the general in-
tent, evident throughout the Act, to include the manufacturer,
distributor, and any other warrantor among those having a di-
rect obligation to the buyer. 177 This is the reason the seller auto-
matically becomes obligated on an express warranty when the
manufacturer elects not to establish repair facilities of his own.
In interpreting some of the Act's more troublesome provisions
courts should remember that under 'the Act the buyer is para-
mount.178
By referring the consumer to the Commercial Code reme-
dies for breach of implied warranties, the Act creates still an-
172. Id. § 1791.1(d).
173. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2714 (West 1964).
174. Id. § 2711(1).
175. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1791.1(d) (West 1973) refers the injured buyer to the
attorney fees provision in section 1794.2(b).
176. Substantive Law Memo, supra note 23, at 36.
177. Id.
178. A court might be constrained, however, to discount time-honored prin-
ciples of the marketplace solely to protect the consumer. Section 2607 (3)(a)
of the Commercial Code requires the buyer to give notice to the seller of a
breach of an implied warranty before bringing suit. It is likely that the courts
would hold a consumer to this same requirement under the Act, since it is one
way of encouraging the parties to settle their differences out of court. Some
well-known California cases have looked with disfavor upon notice requirements
absent a statutory provision, but these cases have generally concerned personal
injuries resulting from the defective product. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963).
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other problem of statutory interpretation. Section 2719 of the
Commercial Code permits the contracting parties to limit or mod-
ify the remedies under other provisions of the Code.' 79 The Act,
however, expressly prohibits limitations or modifications of im-
plied warranties whenever an express warranty has been given.' 80
If section 2719 is read to permit limitations on damages for
breach of an implied warranty, it would undercut the purpose of
this provision in the Act, which is clearly intended to preserve the
full effect of implied warranties in consumer transactions. This
conflict may be resolved by returning to the intent of the drafts-
men. It is absurd to suggest that they would have taken such
care to preserve the rights of the buyer under implied warranties
and at the same time leave him with a remedy that manufacturers
and sellers could modify or avoid by a waiver. It is here that
section 1790.3,"' which provides that the Act's provisions shall
prevail if in conflict with those of the Commercial Code, could
be employed to void an attempt by a warrantor to escape his re-
sponsibilities under the Act. Still one more problem is appar-
ent. An implied warranty disclaimer which is clearly illegal un-
der the Act may be perfectly acceptable under the Commercial
Code."'82 Yet if the buyer wishes to bring an action for breach
of implied warranty under the Act, he must under section 1791.1
(d) 183 go to the Commercial Code for his remedy. The Code,
however, recognizes the validity of the disclaimer, placing the
buyer in the afiomalous position of seeking redress under the
Commercial Code even though none of its provisions has been
violated! Unless section 1791.1(d) is interpreted to allow incor-
poration into the Act of the Commercial Code remedies for
breach of implied warranty without also requiring a violation of
the Code provisions, the buyer may have a right without a rem-
edy--clearly not the intent of the legislature.' 84
179. The modification must not cause the remedy "to fail of its essential pur-
pose." CAL. COMM. CODE § 2719 (West 1964). The Uniform Commercial
Code Comment 1 to this section explains that
where an apparently fair and reasonable clause because of circum-
stances fails in its purpose or operates to deprive either party of the
substantial value of the bargain, it must give way to the general rem-
edy provisions of this Article.
180. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1793 (West 1973). The Act also prohibits the waiv-
ing of any rights under it, including those arising out of an implied warranty.
Id. § 1790.1.
181. Id. § 1790.3.
182. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1792.4 and 1793 (West 1973), with CAL.
COMM. CODE § 2316 (West 1964).
183. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1791.1(d) (West 1973). See text accompanying note
172 supra.
184. Id. Section 1790.3 of the Civil Code provides further support for this
position by resolving conflicts between the Act and the Commercial Code in
favor of the Act.
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CONSUMER AWARENESS OF THE ACT
Clearly the provisions of the Act could have revolutionary
impact on the field of consumer protection. Since it is unique
among attempts to deal with consumer warranties,' and since
it has been in effect now for three years, it is curious that the Act
has not achieved greater renown. Compared with other legisla-
tion in the consumer arena, such as the Federal Truth in Lending
Act"' and California's Unruh Act,"8 ' the Song-Beverly Act has
received only minimal publicity. It is perhaps possible that man-
ufacturers and retailers of consumer goods have begun en masse
to adhere to the provisions of the Act, both in form and sub-
stance.' The more logical conclusion, however, is that the
vast majority of California consumers are unaware of the Act,
and manufacturers and merchants are not likely to inform them
of it.
Given the problems highlighted by this comment, it is diffi-
cult to conclude that the provisions of the Act are so clear that no
interpretation by a court might be required. And yet, as of this
writing, no reported decision in any case arising under the Act has
been decided on an appellate level. Unfortunately, it appears that
the practicing bar, like the consumer, is unfamiliar with the po-
tential of the Act.'
185. As of this writing the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commis-
sion Improvement Act (originally passed by the United States Senate as the Mag-
nuson-Moss Consumer Warranty Act, S. 986, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)) has
not become law. The most recent version of this legislation (S. 356, 93rd Cong.,
1st Sess., reported in 119 CONG. REc..16,439 (Daily ed. Sept. 12, 1973)) would
provide minimum national standards for written consumer warranties. A sup-
plier of consumer goods writing such a warranty would be required to undertake
the minimum duties of repairing or replacing the defective product within a rea-
sonable time and without charge.
Unlike the Song-Beverly Act the Magnuson-Moss Act does not require spec-
ificity as to location of service facilities, nor does it provide for treble damages
for a willful violation of its provisions. It specifies only a reasonable time for
warranty repairs instead of a thirty-day limit as in the Song-Beverly Act. The
federal act does, however, provide that either the Attorney General or the FTC
may intervene to seek an injunction against any supplier of consumer goods
deemed to be in violation of any of the Act's provisions, where the goods con-
cerned "affect" interstate commerce.
186. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 etseq. (1970).
187. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1801 et seq. (West 1973).
188. But see note 105 supra.
189. Interview with Richard A. Elbrecht, attorney at law and author of Sub-
stantive Law Memo on Warranties, supra note 33, in Santa Cruz, California, Jan-
uary 31, 1974.
As one commentator has observed, members of the private bar are not likely
to be motivated to vindicate the relatively minor claim of an aggrieved consumer
by the promise of recovering only a token fee. See Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees
in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 301, 335 (1973). However, as-
suming the legislature intended by section 1794 of the Act that attorney's fees
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If legislation such as this is to be meaningful to the con-
sumer, he must know of its existence and import. Unfortunately,
the Song-Beverly Act does not contain provisions for self-educa-
tion of the consumer. Provisions of this type requiring signs in
conspicuous locations informing the consumer of his rights under
certain other legislation are not new to California and have
worked well. 190 Such a provision or one by which the manu-
facturer or other warrantor is required to inform the consumer
of his rights in clear language conspicuously positioned within the
text of the warranty would be a welcome addition to the Act. 9 '
CONCLUSION
Professor Mueller observed that perhaps the most frustrat-
ing fact of life for the consumer who has purchased a faulty prod-
uct is the inadequacy of the existing legal remedies to provide a
meaningful solution to his problem.' 92  Neither the sales laws
presently on the books nor our machinery of justice are designed
with the little man or his minor claim in mind. Unless he is in-
jured by the product, permitting him to recover sizable damages
in tort, he is relegated to pursuing contract remedies, which
have been weighted against him from the start by the pervasive,
merchant-oriented doctrine of "freedom of contract.' 91 3  The
be awarded based not upon the amount the consumer recovers but upon the rea-
sonable value of the services rendered, private attorneys will have an economic
incentive to take consumer cases and, more importantly, will be motivated to
familiarize themselves with the Act in the hope of representing consumers in fu-
ture cases.
190. Typical of the self-education provisions is the one contained in the Auto-
motive Repair Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 9880 et scq. (West Supp. 1974).
Section 9884.17 of the Business and Professions Code provides, in part:
The [B]ureau [of Automotive Repair] shall design and approve of a
sign which shall be placed in all automobile repair dealer locations in
a place and manner conspicuous to the public. Such sign shall give
notice that inquiries concerning service may be made to the bureau and
shall contain the telephone number of the bureau. Such sign shall also
give notice that the customer is entitled to a return of replaced parts
upon his request therefor at the time the work order is taken.
191. In Slawson, supra note 59, at 566, the point is made that with better
legislative control of what is permissible in a standard form contract, the con-
sumer may at least gain the assurance that the document he signs has been re-
viewed for fairness by a legitimate higher authority-the legislature-ultimately
responsible to him. It would seem that requiring the warrantor to inform the
consumer of what the legislature has ordained in his behalf would be an impor-
tant step toward eliminating the unfairness inherent in a form contract.
See also Leff, supra note 137, at 155-57, wherein the solution proposed for
the problem of form contracts is to treat the contract, "the paper-with-words
which accompanies the sale of a product," as part of that product and to regulate
its quality just as the quality of the product itself is regulated for the public
good.
192. Mueller, supra note 1, at 578.
193. Id. at 578-79.
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Song-Beverly Act is a bona fide legislative attempt to ease some
of the difficulties inherent in pursuing minor contract claims
arising out of warranties. Whether or not it will succeed de-
pends upon many factors, not the least of which is how courts
will interpret some of its provisions.
The Act provides the consumer with procedural and sub-
stantive rights heretofore largely ignored. It gives meaning to
the traditional "repair-or-replace" express warranty by establish-
ing minimum procedural requirements which the consumer may
enforce against the manufacturer in the event the product fails
to conform to the warranty. Beyond this, the Act affords some
prospective protection to the consumer when goods under an
express 'warranty 'become defective within a reasonable time after
the date of purchase.
At least as important to the consumer is the Act's attempt
to revive the significance of implied warranties by making it dif-
ficult and, in most instances, impractical for the manufacturer
to disclaim them. Furthermore, the fact that merchantability
under the Act has become a prospective guarantee is a significant
innovation. That the requirement of privity of contract between
manufacturer and consumer has been eliminated, with respect to
either express or implied warranties, clearly inures to the benefit
of the consumer. In addition, the provisions permitting recovery
of reasonable attorney's fees and treble damages for willful breach
of the Act's procedural requirements will help the consumer by
encouraging private attorneys to accept cases on a non-charitable
'basis and by discouraging those liable under the warranties from
avoiding their duties.'9 4
It has been the purpose of this comment to examine the
Song-Beverly Act's potential for eliminating the contracts of frus-
tration described in Professor Mueller's article." 5 To be sure,
there are difficulties with the Act. Many of its provisions are
unclear and subject to widely different interpretations. It does
not address itself to some of the problems consumers face when
purchasing warranted products, the most notorious of which is
the problem of warranty advertising. What is required is a sys-
tem of "counter-advertising" which would develop consumer
awareness of the Act's provisions. The Act should be amended to
provide for a variety of consumer education techniques. 96 De-
spite the loopholes, uncertainties, and other problems common
194. See Comment, Song-Beverly, supra note 33, at 210. See also note 189
supra.
195. See note 1 supra.
196. See notes 190-91 and accompanying text supra.
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to all legislative enactments, however, the Song-Beverly Con-
sumer Warranty Act is a useful and innovative piece of legislation,
which, if reasonably interpreted, can work for the benefit of all
California consumers.
Ralph J. Swanson*
* The author wishes to thank Mr. Richard A. Elbrecht, attorney at law,
of Santa Cruz, California, whose time, interest and ideas were of invaluable
assistance in the preparation of this comment.
